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The Fourth Amendment and The New Face of
Terrorism: How September 11 th Could
Change the Way America Flies*
INTRODUCTION

Depriving a hijacker of his weapon is critical, because by
means of a weapon like a pistol or even a knife the hijacker
may literally turn the plane' itself into a weapon,
threatening not only those within it, but those on the
ground as well. In short, the plane may become a weapon
of mass destruction that no ordinary person would have
any way of obtaining except through a hijacking.'
he reflection quoted above is from a Second Circuit Court of
Such an
Appeals opinion from almost thirty years ago.
observation has taken on more significance following the
recent devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. In order to protect the lives and safety of the greatest number of
people, "the hijacker must be discovered when he is least dangerous to
others and when he least expects confrontation with the police."'2 "In
practical terms, this means while he is still on the ground and before he has
taken any overt action." 3 The average airport security system in operation
in the United States "places the firewall between terrorists and airplanes in
the hands of the airport passenger and cargo screeners and the equipment
they operate. ' 4 September l1th illustrated that terrorists intent on
bypassing existing airport security measures cannot only do so, but they
can also create the mass destruction that concerned the Second Circuit so
many years ago.

* The author would like to dedicate this work, in loving memory, to Michael
David Skean, David Lee Skean, and Richard Owen Miles.
1. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1974).
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
2.

840 (1973).
3. Id. at 49.
4.

John Croft, Israeli Security Experts: Technology Not The Answer, AVIATION

WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 26, 2001, at 68.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 22-3

The number of daily flights dropped 22 percent last fall when the
airlines resumed operation; the number of passengers dropped by 37
percent.' What can be done to allay the fears of air commuters and ensure
that an attack of this magnitude never happens again? Given that the two
competing interests of airline security and passenger privacy need to be met
in tandem, how much of their civil liberties will the average citizen have to
relinquish in order to meet those goals?
This comment will examine the possible repercussions of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on airport security measures and how future
judicial review might take into consideration the now compelling
governmental interest in safe airways. While this comment will analyze
the possible justifications and the constitutionality of physical searches of
potential airline travelers, it will stipulate to the non-discriminatory
characteristics of the passenger profiling system currently employed by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).6 Part I will examine how the
Fourth Amendment has been applied to airport security procedures in the
past and discuss several exceptions to the Amendment's warrant
requirement that have been contemplated by the courts. Part II will look at
modem air security jurisprudence and discuss how courts have extended or
altered the already existing exceptions to the warrant requirement to
include the security inspections conducted at airports. Finally, Part III will
suggest important factors that future judicial analysis of Fourth
Amendment violations should consider when analyzing stringent airport
security measures conducted to thwart the modem threat of terrorism. Part
III will also attempt to answer the obvious question of whether, in today's

5.
Jayne Clark and Kitty Bean Yancey, Flying By The New Rules; Welcome To
The Safer- But Slower-Skies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at Cl, C3.
6.
In camera review of the specific criteria used to evaluate potential hijackers has
been found to be non-discriminatory on the basis of religion, origin, political views, or race.
See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding the
characteristics of the profile do not violate any of the traditional equal protection standards);
see also United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 991
(1972) (noting the profile is based on scientific, sociological and psychological data
objectively applied by the security personnel). This comment does not question those
previous findings, nor does it question the constitutionality of the FAA's Computer-Assisted
Passenger Screening program. See Michael J. AuBuchon, Choosing How Safe is Enough:
Increased Antiterrorist Federal Activity and its Effect on the General Public and the
Airport/Airline Industry, 64 J. AIR L. & CoM. 891, 904 (1999) (discussing the CAPS
program and the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security). By
stipulating to the constitutionality of the FAA's program, this comment declines to discuss
racial profiling and potential discrimination, equal protection guarantees, and other
problems that may arise in the application of such a program. Such broad topics are better
addressed in subsequent commentary.
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terrorist climate, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when a person
enters an airport, and if not, whether there is any Fourth Amendment
protection.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AIRLINE PASSENGERS

A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.7
The purposes of the Amendment, and its requirement of a warrant, are
to eliminate searches not based on probable cause, and to limit searches
that are deemed necessary.8 A search warrant insures that a "deliberate,
impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the
citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the
information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause." 9
Searches conducted without a search warrant are considered per se
unreasonable unless they fall under a "few specifically established and
When evaluating Fourth Amendment
well-delineated exceptions."'
violations, the United States Supreme Court has defined the term "seizure"
as a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
that property."' 1 However, "search" has not been explicitly defined by a
majority of the Court. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States 12 has become the adopted approach in determining what
constitutes a search and whether it falls under the Fourth Amendment's
protection, and thus requires a warrant. Although not specifically

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Cooks, 493 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1974).
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
389 U.S. at 360.
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concerned with airport security, Katz underlies most of the present cases.13
In Katz, FBI agents attached electronic listening devices to the outside of a
public telephone booth in which the defendant Katz had made
4
incriminating statements regarding his illegal bookmaking activities. 1
Prior to Katz, searches had been evaluated in terms of a physical trespass. 15
In noting the "reach of the Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion,"'16 the Court appeared to shift the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections from "freedom of invasion of trespass to
freedom from unwarranted invasion of one's right to privacy."' 7 Justice
Harlan pointed out that the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not
places." 18 To be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, a two-fold
requirement must be met: (1) a person must have exhibited an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation of privacy is one
that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"" 9 In United States v.
White, 20 Justice Harlan, dissenting, noted that the Fourth Amendment is
primarily concerned with "those more extensive intrusions that
significantly jeopardize [one's] sense of security.''
Justice Harlan
appeared to suggest that society's values of the past and the present must be
evaluated in determining the reasonable expectation of privacy.
Therefore, such abstract principles as reasonableness and privacy would
change as the customs and interests of a particular society changed.
When applied to airline security, the courts have balanced the
individual passenger's right to be free from exceedingly invasive searches
with society's substantial interest in safe air travel.23 The courts have
generally held that airport security measures are within the scope of the

13.
Jonathan Lewis Miller, Search and Seizure of Air Passengersand Pilots: The
FourthAmendment Takes Flight, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 199, 202 (1994) (analogizing that if the
Fourth Amendment were thought of as the point of an inverted pyramid, Katz would be one
of a few cases resting directly upon the Fourth Amendment).
14.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
15.
Miller, supra note 13, at 203.
16.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
17.
Miller, supra note 13, at 203.
18.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
19.
Id.
20.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(holding that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by a government
informant covertly wiretapping a conversation).
21.
Id. at 786.
22.
Id.
23.
See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 947 (1972) (stating proper analysis of the airport security search is the search's
reasonableness).
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Fourth Amendment. 24 "If the complaining individual did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the intrusion, the Fourth
Amendment is inapplicable; if he did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, however, the government must demonstrate that the intrusion was
justified under Fourth Amendment standards. 2 5 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment only protects individuals from those searches that are
considered unreasonable. With the widespread use of security measures
throughout the average airport, one must ask whether an individual has any
reasonable expectation of privacy when preparing to travel by airplane. In
26
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion of United States v. Bell,
Judge Friendly, in his concurrence, explained:
When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives
and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating
or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets
the test of reasonableness .... Since all air passengers and
their baggage can thus be constitutionally searched, there is
no legal objection to searching only some .... 27
Under such a rubric, almost all airport security procedures, conducted
with the purpose of preventing hijacking or other serious damage, would
pass Fourth Amendment muster. Potential passengers, if aware of the
existence of such intrusive procedures beforehand, would have no
reasonable expectation of privacy and could only avoid invasions of
privacy by choosing not to travel by air.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

1. Stop and Frisk Searches
The Supreme Court, in their 1968 decision of Terry v. Ohio, first
addressed warrantless "stop and frisk" searches conducted by law
enforcement officials. 8 Prior to that case, the Court had "never before

See Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770 (holding that use of a magnetometer was a
24.
"search" applicable under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Davis, 482
F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that airport search program constituted a "search").
Davis, 482 F.2d at 904-05.
25.
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
26.
991 (1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 675 (emphasis in original).
27.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28.
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been squarely presented" with the "difficult and troublesome issues
regarding [this] sensitive area of police activity. 2 9 The Court initially
noted that "wherever an individual may harbor a 'reasonable expectation
of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from governmental intrusion," 30 noting
the previous standard of reasonableness set forth in Katz v. United States.3
However, "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures,
but unreasonable searches and seizures' '32 In Terry, a plain-clothed police
officer observed the defendant Terry and two other individuals engage in
suspicious behavior that led the officer to believe the individuals were
planning a daylight robbery.33
The police officer approached the
individuals, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for the
individuals' names. 34 A mumbled response to his inquiries prompted the
police officer to grab Terry and pat down the outside of his clothing, in an
attempt to reveal the presence of any weapons. 35 According to the trial
court, such a search was permitted in order to guarantee the safety of the
investigative officer for, without such a search, the answer from a
suspected criminal to an inquiry by the officer might be a bullet from a
concealed weapon.36 In affirming, the Supreme Court held that a police
officer could "seize" an individual, that is, stop and temporarily hold the
person, if the officer reasonably and objectively believes that "criminal
activity may be afoot. 37 Once he has detained the suspect, the officer is
permitted to conduct a "carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
[the individual] in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him,, 38 if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed
and dangerous. The Court noted that such a search was limited in nature,
only a search for weapons, and was "not a general exploratory search for..
evidence of criminal activity. 39 Thus, in Terry, the Supreme Court
established the doctrine that allowed a limited frisk for weapons without
the requirement of a search warrant.

29. Id. at 9-10.
30. Id. at 9 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 381 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
31.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
32.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
33.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
34.
Id. at 6-7.
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 8.
37.
Id. at 30.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.

2002]

THE FOURTHAMENDMENTAND THE NEW FACE OF TERRORISM

United States v. Lopez4 was one of the first decisions regarding the
constitutionality of airport security procedures. Lopez, while proceeding
41
through the security checkpoint, activated a metal detector. As a result,
two Deputy United States Marshals frisked Lopez for weapons, and found
a tinfoil covered plastic envelope filled with heroin. The district court
found that "the only exception to the warrant rule under which the search of
this defendant [could] be justified is the protective 'frisk' for weapons
authorized by Terry v. Ohio."42 The Lopez court did not specifically
address whether the defendant's expectation of privacy had been violated,
43
but noted the "courts are in a position to prevent abuse" when it arises.
Lopez's limited holding was soon expanded to justify more intrusive
searches under the Terry "stop and frisk" doctrine. In United States v.
Epperson,44 the Fourth Circuit allowed a search of an airline passenger to
45
be carried out solely on the basis of the activation of a magnetometer,
without any regard to whether the passenger met the criteria of the hijacker
profile.46 The court recognized that the "reasonableness of any search must
be determined by balancing the governmental interest in searching against
the invasion of privacy which the search entails." 47 The court noted that
"ordinarily the securing of a warrant is supported by an affidavit of facts
and circumstances sufficient to enable an impartial magistrate to judge its
necessity and justification, but air piracy and its threat to national air
48 The Fourth
commerce is known to all and may be judicially noticed."
Circuit reasoned that requiring the prerequisite warrant, which the judicial
''9
over substance.
officer would probably grant anyway, would "exalt form
As the court stated, "[T]he danger is so overwhelming, and the invasion of
privacy so minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by exigent
national circumstances. '' 50 The court also found that the scope of the
search was reasonably related to its purpose, and "fully justified the
minimal invasion of personal privacy by [the] magnetometer... [because]
40. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 1081-82.
41.
Id. at 1093.
42.
43. Id. at 1101.
44. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,406 U.S.
947 (1972).
45. A magnetometer is also known as an electronic metal detector. See Gibson v.
State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 751, n. 1 (Tex. App. 1996) (explaining the function and operation of
a magnetometer).
Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
46.
Id. at 771.
47.
Id.
48.
Epperson, 454 F.2d at 771.
49.
Id.
50.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22-3

the person scrutinized is not even aware of the examination."'" It was clear
to the court "that to innocent passengers the use of a magnetometer to
detect metal on those boarding an aircraft is not a resented intrusion on
privacy, but, instead, a welcome reassurance of safety. 52 Such a search
was more than reasonable; it was a "compelling necessity to protect
essential air commerce and the lives of passengers. 53
The Second Circuit extended the Terry stop and frisk approach in
United States v. Bell,5 4 holding that the search need not be limited to
weapons which might be used against the officer personally.5 5 Bell not
only activated a magnetometer, but also had no identification and admitted
to the security official that he was out on bail for attempted murder and
narcotics charges. 6 In upholding the search, the court noted there is an
"apprehension of the officer for the safety of others as well as himself. '57
"[T]he weapon of the skyjacker is not limited to the conventional weaponry
of the bank robber or of the burglar . . . [h]is arsenal may well include
explosives.' 5 8 Two years later, in United States v. Clark,59 the Second
Circuit extended its holding in Bell and applied the stop and frisk analysis
to justify searches of carry-on luggage. As in Bell, the defendant activated
the magnetometer, had no identification, and acted "strangely." 6° While
these subsequent decisions extended the stop and frisk doctrine past the
dimensions enunciated by Terry itself, it is clear that courts were following
the admonition of the Epperson court that "reasonableness is still the
ultimate standard,",6 ' and that reasonableness was to be determined by
balancing the governmental interests with the individual's right to
privacy.62

51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 772.
53.
Id.
54.
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2nd Ciri. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972).
55.
Id. at 673.
56.
Id. at 668-69.
57.
Id. at 673.
58.
Id. at 674.
59.
United States v. Clark, 498 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the standard
set forth in Bell justified the search of the defendant's person and effects).
60. Id. at 536.
61.
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972) (quoting Camara
v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)).
62.
Id.
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2. Administrative Searches
The United States Supreme Court addressed administrative searches in
its 1997 decision of Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San
Francisco.63 In Camara, the lessee of a ground floor apartment building
was charged with violating the city housing code for refusing to permit
warrantless inspection of his premises by municipal health and safety
inspectors. 64 In upholding the administrative and regulatory search, the
Court held that the "primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent
even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to
public health and safety. 6 5 The Court noted:
[T]he only effective way to seek universal compliance with
the minimum standards required by municipal codes is
through routine periodic inspections of all structures. It is
here that the probable cause debate is focused, for the
agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is
unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area
as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each
particular building.6 6
In United States v. Davis,67 where a routine security check revealed68
a loaded gun,
that the defendant was attempting to board an airplane with
the Ninth Circuit refused to limit the justification for airport security
searches to the Terry stop and frisk doctrine. Instead, the court held that
searches conducted in furtherance of a regulatory administrative purpose
might be permissible under the Fourth Amendment, despite the lack of
either a warrant or probable cause. 69 Administrative searches stem from
7°
When
the government's need to oversee a highly regulated activity.
deciding whether a search is administrative in nature, the court must make
a dual determination: (1) whether the search serves a narrow but
compelling administrative objective and (2) whether the intrusion is as
"limited as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1966).
Id. at 525-27.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 535-36.
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 896.
Id. at 907-08.
Miller, supra note 13, at 206.
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justifies it.' '71 The Davis court balanced the competing interests of the
government's prevention of airline hijacking and the passenger's
expectation of privacy and, like the Epperson court, found that the scales
tipped in favor of the government. "The need to prevent airline hijacking is
unquestionably grave and urgent. The potential damage to person and
property from such acts is enormous., 72 Because the security measures
were not utilized to secure evidence in a criminal investigation, but were
rather used as a regulatory means to thwart the threat of airplane hijackings,
the Davis court characterized the search as administrative. 73 "The essential
purpose of the scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives or to
apprehend those who carry them, but to deter persons carrying such
material from seeking to board at all." 74 If, however, such a regulatory
search becomes "subverted into a general search for evidence of crime ...
the courts will exclude the evidence obtained. 75 Once the administrative
search is determined to be an exception to the warrant requirement, the
constitutionality of the search will be upheld if it meets the Fourth
76
Amendment's standard of reasonableness.
The Davis court concluded that a "pre-boarding screening of all
passengers and cany-on articles sufficient in scope to detect the presence of
weapons or explosives is reasonably necessary" to prevent airline
hijacking.77 A warrant is not required and would only "frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search. 78 The court did stress one
important caveat to the administrative search's reasonableness. "Airport
screening searches are valid only if they recognize the right of a person to
avoid the search by electing not to board the aircraft., 79 Because the
administrative purpose recognized in Davis was to deter passengers from
carrying weapons or explosives onto an airplane, the search cannot be
justifiably applied to those passengers who did not board the airplane.
Such a search would be outside the scope of the administrative purpose and
be unreasonable. Therefore, the option of not flying was crucial to the
Davis court. "We have held that, as a matter of constitutional law, a

71.
United States v. $124,570 United States Currency, 873 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (9th
Cir. 1989) (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 910).
72.
Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
73.
Id. at 908.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 909.
76.
Davis, 482 F.2d at 910; see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text
(discussing the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness).
77.
Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
78.
Id. (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1966)).
79.
Id. at 910-11.
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prospective passenger has a choice: he may submit to a search of his person
and immediate possessions as a condition to being boarding; or he may turn
around and leave."8 °
3. Borders and Other CriticalZones
Since the founding of the United States, Congress "has granted the
Executive [branch] plenary authority to conduct routine searches and
seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to
regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of
contraband into this country. '81 This extension of police power is derived
from the inherent authority of the national sovereign to defend itself from
outside threats and harmful influences, including the "power to prohibit the
export of its currency, national treasures, and other assets., 82 This power
extends to all routine searches at the nation's borders, irrespective of
whether persons or effects are entering or exiting from the country.83
Consistent with Congress' sovereign power to protect the nation by
stopping and examining individuals who wish to enter the country, the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness is "qualitatively different
at the international border than in the interior." 84 Therefore, searches
occurring at an international border are justified simply because they occur
at the border. Entrants have no reasonable expectation of privacy and
routine searches of their persons and belongings are "not subject to any
requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause or warrant."85 To fall
under the exception, the searches must be routine. In making that
determination, the courts have looked to the degree of intrusion into the
entrant's legitimate expectations of privacy. 86 "Routine border inspections
are those that do not pose a serious invasion of privacy and that do not
embarrass or offend the average traveler., 87 The border search exception is
further extended to those areas which are considered the "functional
equivalent" of an international border. 88 A non-stop international flight
arriving in Chicago or Saint Louis will be considered an entry at the border

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 913.
United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
Id.
United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 1290.
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even though the flight has landed well within the boundaries of the United
States. As a result, routine searches conducted upon the arrival of an
international flight are considered an exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement and are justified on reasonable suspicion alone.
The "critical zone" approach is an expansion of the border search
doctrine. It theorizes that airports, by virtue of their special character, are
analogous to national borders and thus should be evaluated under a more
lenient standard of reasonableness for Fourth Amendment considerations.
United States v. Moreno89 was one of the first decisions to apply the
"critical zone" approach, upholding the search of the defendant in an
airport restroom. In holding that the airport was a "critical zone" akin to an
international border, the Fifth Circuit observed that the airport was the "one
channel through which all hijackers must pass before being in a position to
commit their crime," and was also the "one point where airport security
officials can marshal their resources to thwart such acts before the lives of
an airplane's passengers and crew are endangered." 90 However, the court
cautioned that it did not "propose to substitute the 'suspicion standard'
applicable in border search cases for the Terry v. Ohio standard," which
was the basis for its decision. 9'
In United States v. Skipwith,92 the Fifth Circuit qualified its Moreno
decision. The court again recognized airports as "critical zones"
characteristic of international borders, but held that a different standard
applies between searches conducted in the general airport area and those
conducted at the boarding gate. 93 Skipwith aroused suspicion when he
presented himself for boarding without any identification, and, after further
questioning, revealed that he had purchased the ticket under an alias. 94 A
subsequent search revealed that Skipwith was attempting to smuggle a
packet of heroin aboard. 95 The court held that a search conducted at a
boarding gate could be executed under the same standard as a search
conducted at a border: suspicion alone was sufficient. 96 Since the search
itself was limited to those people attempting to board, mere passerby would
not be subjected to the search. Thus, the "net" of security could "sweep no
wider than necessary since the broad right to search is limited to the last

89.

840 (1973).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 51 n.8.

United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).

Id. at 1276-77.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id.
Id. at 1275.

20021

THE FOURTHAMENDMENTAND THE NEW FACE OF TERRORISM

possible point in time and space which could protect the aircraft, the
boarding gate (or secure corridor entrance). 97 The person to be searched
has to voluntarily come to and enter the search area, ensuring an
98
opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the boarding area.
Skipwith, then, appeared to limit the airport's "critical zone" to the
boarding gate, rather than the entire airport premises.
4. The Consent Exception
The final applicable exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement involves searches conducted with the consent of the person
being searched. Fourth Amendment rights can be waived by consent so
long as the consent is freely and voluntarily given and not the result of
fraud, duress, or coercion. 99 The determination of consent must be made
from a totality of the circumstances.'0° The Ninth Circuit Davis court,
while addressing administrative searches, recognized that consent is also a
factor in determining whether the passenger's right to privacy has been
violated.' 0 The court recognized that in the airport screening area, the
passenger has a choice of submitting to the search or leaving; individuals
who choose to proceed, relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights. 10 2 The
Fifth Circuit has also acknowledged the importance of the passenger's
consent to be searched. Justifying the "critical zone" approach in Skipwith,
the court grounded its opinion on the fact that "the person to be searched
must voluntarily come to and enter the search area [and] has every
' 3
opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the boarding area."'
This distinction mitigates some of the offensiveness the screening process
might incur.Y'O
The Ninth Circuit addressed the consent exception more directly in
United States v. Miner.0 5 Relying on Davis, the court held that Miners
approaching the counter with the obvious intention of boarding the airplane
constituted an implied "consent" within the meaning of Davis.'°6 In so
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holding, the court appeared to be particularly influenced by two key facts.
First, the search occurred at a time when "concern over the problem of
airplane hijackings was at its peak"'10 7 and "three months after the FAA had
ordered the airlines to screen all potential passengers."' 0 8 Second, Miner
admitted that he had flown several times before and "had seen signs
warning that all passengers and their baggage were subject to search, '1°9
and knew what the warnings meant. Despite the prior notification, Miner
still attempted to board the airplane. There was some conflicting evidence
concerning Miner's attempt to withdraw his "consent" and the Ninth
Circuit remanded for clarification on those issues."0
I-wever, the court
noted that requesting to search Miner's baggage "could be justified only if
he continued to manifest an intention to board the plane, or if he otherwise
consented to the search.""' "At that point, the airline employees would
have been justified in refusing to permit him to fly, but they could not
compel him to submit to further search."' 1 2 The Miner decision is best
understood to hold that a defendant who approaches an airport check-in
counter with the intention of boarding the plane impliedly consents to a
search by airport security personnel. If the passenger then withdraws that
consent by refusing to be subject to the search and refusing to board the
plane, the search must be terminated." 3

II. MODERN JURISPRUDENCE OF AIR SECURITY

A. IMPLIED CONSENT

Most of the federal circuits now recognize that magnetometer searches
and the use of x-ray machines are considered administrative searches and
are an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.' 14 The
Supreme Court has recognized the lower courts' application of the
administrative search doctrine and consistent conclusion that such searches
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 5 In its 1989 Von Raab
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decision, the Court noted, "[i]n the 15 years the program has been in effect,
more than 9.5 billion persons have been screened, and over 10 billion
pieces of luggage have been inspected."' " 6 In addition, many of the federal
courts apply the caveat that was stressed in Davis: a passenger could avoid
the search by electing to not board the aircraft. 17
However, the Davis test was modified in the Ninth Circuit's 1986
decision of United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo"8 where the court addressed
"the extent to which a passenger impliedly consents to a visual inspection
and limited hand search of carry-on luggage for the detection of weapons
or explosives as a condition to airline travel."'' 19 The defendant, PulidoBaquerizo, attempted to board a flight at Los Angeles International
Airport.120 He approached the pre-boarding inspection checkpoint and
placed two briefcases on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt.121 , The
security agent operating the machine noticed a dark lined object on the
monitor and suspected the object might be a bomb. 22 The security officer
questioned the defendant about the object and a subsequent search of the
defendant's luggage revealed 2,138 grams of cocaine. 23
At the pre-trial suppression hearing, the defendant moved to suppress
the drugs on the grounds that he did not give express consent to search his
briefcase, and that he was not free to leave during the security officer's
questioning. 4 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress.1 5 In reversing the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit held
that a passenger who places luggage on a conveyor belt to be x-rayed at a
secure boarding area impliedly consents to a visual inspection and limited
hand search if "the x-ray is inconclusive in determining whether the
luggage contains weapons or other dangerous objects."' 26 The court noted
that, while Davis did require that a potential passenger may withhold his
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consent to be searched by electing not to fly, the decision did not address
"at what point in the boarding process a passenger may decide not to fly
and thereby withdraw his implied consent."'' 27 The Ninth Circuit held that
the "requirement in Davis of allowing passengers to avoid the search by not
electing to fly does not extend to a passenger who has already submitted his
luggage for an x-ray scan."' 28 The court reasoned that a rule which allowed
''a passenger to leave without a search after an inconclusive x-ray scan
would encourage airline terrorism by providing a secure exit where
detection was threatened."'' 29 Therefore, if a passenger decides to avoid a
search, "he must elect not30to fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray
machine's conveyor belt."'
This concept of implied consent articulated in the Ninth Circuit's
Pulido-Baquerizo decision has been continually applied in the various
district courts.' 3' In United States v. Doe,132 the District Court recognized
the Pulido-Baquerizo clarification and held that the defendant at bar
implicitly waived his right of electing not to fly, and thus avoiding the
search when he chose to submit his luggage for x-ray inspection. 33 In
addition, the District Court in United States v. Krug, 34 although it does not
specifically mention the Ninth Circuit's decision, stated "federal courts
have long held that those passengers who approach airport screening
devices impliedly consent to the search of their person and their carry-on
bags,"'135 and upheld the physical search of the defendant's luggage.
B. USING A FRISK AS A LAST RESORT

In its 1974 decision of United States v. Albarado,136 the Second
Circuit adopted the rule that a physical frisk of a passenger should be

127.
Pulido-Baquerizo,800 F.2d at 902.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
See United States v. Doe, 829 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D.P.R. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 61 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that a passenger relinquishes his right to
avoid a search once he submits his luggage for an x-ray scan). See generally United States v.
Krug, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069 (M.D. Tenn. 1999), aff'd on other grounds, No. 99-6542,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19838 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2001) (holding defendant consented to
search of his suitcase when he checked his luggage at ticket counter).
132. 829 F. Supp 511 (D.P.R. 1993).
133.
Id. at 514.
134.
Krug, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
135. Id. at 1068.
136. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974).

2002]

THE FOURTHAMENDMENTAND THE NEW FACE OF TERRORISM

utilized only as a last resort. 13 7 The defendant, an older man who spoke
Spanish but no English, activated a magnetometer while passing through

the boarding area at Kennedy Airport in New York City. 138 There was

evidence of signs posted in Spanish and English stating that it is'a federal
crime to carry weapons on board an aircraft and passengers are subject to
search.139 There was also evidence of routine announcements in Spanish
and English at boarding times informing passengers of potential
searches. 140 After activating the magnetometer, the defendant was patted
down by a United States Customs agent and a small package wrapped in
aluminum foil, which contained counterfeit twenty-dollar
bills, was
14 1
removed from the defendant's inside jacket pocket.
The Second Circuit declined to uphold the search on the basis of the
Davis caveat of consent: "[t]o make one choose between flying to one's
destination and exercising one's constitutional right [of unreasonable
searches and seizures] appears to [be] . ..a form of coercion, however
subtle.' ' 142 The court noted, "it would work a considerable hardship on
many air travelers to be forced to utilize an alternate form of transportation,
assuming one exists at all."' 14 3 The court instead looked to Terry v. Ohio to
justify the intrusion on the passenger's expectation of privacy.' 44 The court
found that activation of the magnetometer did not justify a subsequent
physical frisk just because the search occurred in an airport. "5 The
question that needed to be asked was "what is the minimal invasion of
privacy consistent with the need for further investigation [to determine
what triggered the magnetometer]?' ' 146 A frisk is only appropriate if "no
lesser readily available means presently exist for determining what
unexplained metal object remains on the passenger's person.' 7 Ifother
less intrusive procedures were available, then those methods should be
utilized first for they entail "far less invasions of the privacy or dignity of148a
person than to have a stranger poke and pat his body in various places."'
Thus, the rule of the court was: "exhaust the other efficient and available
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means, if any, by which to discover the location and14identity
of the metal
9
activating the magnetometer before utilizing the frisk."'
The Second Circuit's holding was utilized in United States v. RomanMarcon.150 After the defendant activated the metal detector, the security
officer used a hand-held detector before searching the defendant's clothing
where the instrument was set off. The court used A lbarado as a procedural
guide to be followed once a passenger has triggered a metal detector for the
first time.t 5 1 Because the security officer used a second magnetometer
sweep before the physical invasion of the passenger's privacy, the court
upheld the frisk.1 52 In so holding, the court was very clear that "the153frisk in
the typical boarding situation is to be used only in the last instance."'
III. THE FUTURE OF AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES

Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness is
"qualitatively different at the international border than in the interior." 154
However, such an application creates a double standard for international
and domestic flights: a passenger traveling within the continental United
States would be subject to less intrusive searches, while a passenger
arriving from abroad would be subject to more intrusive searches. The
differing standards become even more profound when one considers the
fact that the attacks of September 11th were executed using domestic
commercial airline flights. Therefore, the border search is not applicable to
all circumstances. "Generally, it is the nature of the means of travel (i.e. by
airplane rather than by car or by foot) rather than the nature of the
destination of the travel (foreign rather than domestic) which intensifies the
concern for the traveler's safety."' 55 While the historic grounds of national
sovereignty and self-protection are valid grounds for awarding an
exemption to the warrant requirement, they "do not closely resemble the
contemporary reasons for exempting domestic airport searches . ... 56
The potential damage to people and property can be wrought by either
domestic or international flights. Using differing standards within an
airport creates areas that may be more vulnerable to attack than others and
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subjects passengers to different levels of privacy invasions and scrutiny by
the court.
Given the threat of terrorism and the government's substantial interest
in safe airline travel, "it is difficult to see how anyone could assert a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a package which is being brought onto
an airplane or through an airport sterile area."' 57 In response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11th, "Congress has called for all checked luggage to
be screened by bomb-detecting machines by the end of 2002."' 8 Until
such machines are in place, "checked bags are subject to hand searches at
airline check-in counters"' 159 and "carry-on bags are subject to searches at
boarding gates in addition to the main security checkpoint."' 160 Such
measures would effectively eliminate any expectation of privacy a
passenger might have had. However, these overly intrusive security
searches are not necessarily unreasonable or offensive; instead, they are a
way of ensuring safe airline travel in the United States.
No one goes through security checkpoints for the pleasure
of it. It's intrusive. It may force you into contact with
perfect strangers. It delays your progress toward your
destination. It's a bother. It's a nuisance. It's a pain in the
neck. But most people put up with it without complaint
because they understand that security screenings serve an
important purpose:
safeguarding us all from armed
attack. 161
In order to thwart potential terrorist activity, airport security measures
will have to adapt to the potential threats. For example, the FAA recently
issued a security directive authorizing a random inspection of passenger's
shoes, resulting in a number of airline passengers having to stand at the
security checkpoints in either their socks or bare feet.162 The new safety
guidelines were in response to an incident on December 22, 2001, incident
aboard American Airlines Flight 63 traveling from Paris to Miami. 63 A
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security lapse allowed a passenger to board with explosives hidden in his
sneakers.164 Other passengers tackled the man after a flight attendant
caught him trying to light the material with a match.1 65 A lapse in security
should not be surprising given the almost Herculean task that modem
airport security personnel face.
Airport security officials have the awesome responsibility
of ferreting out hijacking threats from among thousands of
passengers while at the same time avoiding any undue
disruption to this nation's heavy flow of commercial air
traffic. Inseparably related to this is the fact that the
hijacker's modus operandi is66 designed to take optimum
advantage of these pressures. 1
To be effective, modem security measures need to take into
consideration the advancements technology has taken in the past few
decades. As the Fifth Circuit observed, it is now possible to "miniaturize
to such a degree ... enough plastic explosives to blow up an airplane can
be concealed in a toothpaste tube" 167 with a "detonator planted in a fountain
pen . . . to set it off.' 68 The Fifth Circuit recognized that "society's law
enforcement capabilities have not caught up with these problems"' 69 nearly
thirty years ago in its 1973 Moreno decision. In order to ensure their health
and safety, airline passengers might be required to surrender their privacy,
their luggage, and even their footwear. "Searches which occur at airport
security checkpoints are not... governed by the same standards as would
be applied to searches conducted on the street, or in any other public
place." 170 The consequences of such searches do not merely affect the
individual being searched. The consequences could affect the safety of
every passenger on board, as well as other individuals and property the
airplane could potentially come into contact with, illustrated quite
harrowingly on September 11, 2001. In the face of such a grave threat, the
courts will be forced to recognize the government's substantial interest in
protecting its air travelers when analyzing the constitutionality of future
airport security searches. One must remember that such searches are meant

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id.

Id.

People v. Waring, 579 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).

2002]

THE FOURTHAMENDMENTAND THE NEW FACE OF TERRORISM

"not a resented intrusion on privacy, but, instead, a welcome reassurance of
safety"'' against the continuing threat of terrorism and air piracy. Frisks,
metal detector scans, and hand searches of a passenger's carry-on luggage
are now ordinary and routine.
A person expects such a search when preparing to board an airplane.
However, airport security personnel should not be given "free license to
exceed what is reasonable and proper under the law in order to accomplish
their important responsibilities."' 72 On the contrary, "[t]hey must be
sensitive to their intrusive powers and not abuse and misuse those powers
so as to adversely affect travelers unjustly and unnecessarily."' 173 To avoid
such indiscretions, courts should look to the Fourth Amendment's standard
of reasonableness. Prior to the recent incident in Miami, 74 courts, as well
as passengers, surely would have considered the removal of footwear for
security inspection unreasonable.
However, as terrorists devise more
cunning methods of bypassing airport security measures, more intrusive
methods of ferreting out their plans may become necessary. Security, by
its very nature is reactive. The Fourth Amendment, and the protections it
affords, must also, in turn, be reactive, responding to what society
considers reasonable in light of past and future terrorist activity. In an age
when terrorists use domestic aircraft to carry out their plans for murder and
mayhem, it is unlikely that potential passengers can expect some degree of
privacy when they enter an airport and prepare to board an airplane. It is
further unlikely that a passenger will be able to invoke the protections of
the Fourth Amendment in order to avoid such searches.
CONCLUSION

To trigger a Fourth Amendment violation, a person must have a
subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable. 75 Courts have acknowledged that airport security searches fall
under the Fourth Amendment's protections, and although there is no
unanimous point of view as to which warrant exception the searches fall
under. "[N]either ... the use of a magnetometer or the frisk seems to fit
readily within any of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement,
and yet each seems reasonable in light of the overwhelming public
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acceptance of the search and the necessity for it.' ' 176 However, something
must be done to ensure the safety of the millions of air passengers that
criss-cross American airways annually. The protections of the Fourth
Amendment must be tempered against the fanaticism of zealots who are
undaunted and unwavering in their cause. As an Irish Republican Army
terrorist once warned: "Today we were unlucky. But177 remember, we only
have to be lucky once - you have to be lucky always."'
BRETT ANDREW SKEAN
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